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DUNS SCOTUS ON DIVINE IMMENSITY
Richard Cross
In a recent article, Hud Hudson analyses divine omnipresence in terms of a 
spatial property, ubiquitous entension, neither reducible to nor derivative from 
any other divine attribute. Hudson’s view is an alternative to the predomi-
nant view in recent philosophical theology, in which omnipresence is reduced 
to omnipotence. I show that Duns Scotus adopts a view that conforms very 
closely to Hudson’s account, and show how he argues against the derivative 
view, which he finds in Aquinas. Hudson claims that ubiquitous entension 
helps dissolve the mystery of causal interactions between God and creatures. 
Scotus argues against this claim. He also argues against the view taken by 
Hudson that entension entails materiality. While fundamentally agreeing 
with Hudson’s basic position, then, Scotus nevertheless provides challenges 
both for Hudson and his opponents.
In a recent article on the subject, Hud Hudson analyses divine omnipres-
ence in terms of a property that he labels “entension.” Entension requires 
for its analysis the notions of being entirely located and being wholly 
located, which Hudson defines as follows:
“x is entirely located at r” =df x is located at r and there is no region of space-
time disjoint from r at which x is located.
“x is wholly located at r” =df x is located at r, and there is no proper part of 
x not located at r.1
Given these definitions, Hudson provides the following definition of “en-
tension”:
“x entends” =df x is an object that is wholly and entirely located at a non-
point-sized region, r, and for each proper subregion of r, r*, x is wholly lo-
cated at r*.2
And given this definition, Hudson offers an analysis of omnipresence: 
omnipresence is just “ubiquitous entension.”3 This is a way of occupying 
space, and the claim that omnipresence is ubiquitous entension is sup-
posed to take God’s spatiality seriously. Hudson’s view is unusual among 
1Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 206.
2Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 206.
3Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 209.
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modern philosophers of religion, who are generally inclined to deny 
that God has this kind of relation to space—preferring to make God’s 
omnipresence derivative from, or even reducible to, some other divine 
attribute—most notably, omnipotence.4 (I take it that reductionism on this 
question is one way of understanding a derivative view. But derivative 
views need not be reductionist, as we shall see.5) Hudson himself formu-
lates his view as an express attempt to find an alternative to the currently 
dominant reductionist view, one that, he claims, offers some hope for an 
explanation of the possibility of God’s knowledge of and action in the ma-
terial world.6 But Ross D. Inman has shown that, far from being novel, 
very close ancestors to Hudson’s non-derivative view can be found in 
Augustine and Anselm.7 And both Robert Pasnau and Edward Grant sug-
gest—though without much discussion or evidence—that it represents 
the standard view in the Middle Ages and beyond.8
In what follows, I propose to test the hypothesis that non-derivative 
views of omnipresence were standard in the Middle Ages by looking at 
what Duns Scotus has to say on the matter. As far as I can see, two varieties 
of the derivative view (reductionist and non-reductionist) that Hudson 
wants to oppose were proposed by Aquinas. Scotus provides a defense of 
the non-derivative view against Aquinas’s derivative views—something 
that we do not find in either Augustine or Anselm (since, I take it, the 
views were unknown to them). Scotus’s account turns out to be in prin-
ciple instructive both for modern adherents of the derivative view and 
for modern adherents of the non-derivative view. On the one side, he 
provides reasons for thinking that the derivative view is false. But one of 
the reasons that Hudson has for adopting his non-derivative view is that 
it helps demystify questions about divine action: how the divine and the 
created realm might be the relata in any kind of causal activity. (Answer: 
by being in spatial contact.) So, on the other side, Scotus provides reasons 
for thinking that a view such as Hudson’s is in fact no help in this de-
mystification, and thus that it needs to be motivated in some other way. 
(I suggest in passing one advantage of Scotus’s view, though it is not an 
advantage that he avails himself of.) Hudson concludes from his view that 
God must be material. Scotus provides a way of resisting this conclusion, 
albeit one rooted in details of his own medieval metaphysics.
4See for an extensive list of recent adherents to reductionist versions of the derivative 
view, see Inman, “Omnipresence.” Alexander Pruss defends a view similar to Hudson’s, in 
his “Omnipresence,” 63–67.
5The contrast terms for “derivative” and “reductionist” are “non-derivative” and “non-
reductionist.” Suppose some divine attributes are basic divine attributes. Non-derivative 
views of divine omnipresence make omnipresence in principle a basic attribute. Non-
reductionist views make omnipresence non-reducible to other divine attributes without 
necessarily requiring that omnipresence is a basic attribute.
6Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 205.
7See Inman, “Omnipresence,” section 3.
8See Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, 337; Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 335.
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I begin by showing how Scotus’s views on the varieties of occupation 
relations relate to Hudson’s. In §2 I show how Scotus applies these views 
to the relation between spiritual substances and the physical universe.9 I 
then show how Scotus responds to Aquinas’s derivative view (§3). These 
two sections, cumulatively, show that Scotus accepts a non-derivative 
view of God’s presence to the physical universe, and give his reasons for 
so doing. In §4 try to relate what Scotus says to the question of divine 
perfection. In my conclusion, I will consider what Scotus would say in re-
action to Hudson’s thesis that all entending objects are—in virtue of their 
entending—corporeal and material. On the way through, I draw from 
Scotus’s discussion of angelic presence in order to cast light on what he 
says about divine presence.
1. Scotus on Place
In his physics, Scotus largely follows Aristotle, and thus he fundamentally 
thinks of the spatial location of extended objects, as Aristotle did, in terms 
of a relation between the object and the surface of its immediately sur-
rounding environment:
Every body (other than the first body) is primarily in a place, that is, exactly 
in an immobile container: for this is what is understood by the definition of 
the Philosopher, Physics IV, “On place,” namely, that “place is the first, im-
mobile edge of a containing body.”10
This view is often thought of as a two-dimensional view of location, as op-
posed to Hudson’s three-dimensional view of space (or four-dimensional 
spacetime)—“two-dimensional” in the sense that a body’s place is the 
inner surface of its surrounding container, contiguous with the body and 
spatially indivisible with respect to depth (as Scotus puts it, “the exact 
container of something is quantitatively indivisible”).11 So I shall talk 
about Scotus’s view on the ways in which extended substances relate to 
space as one in which they strictly speaking occupy not space but place.
As Scotus understands his position on place-occupancy, it immediately 
entails that a place-occupier’s surface is equal to the surface of its place: 
“on account of [their having] the same quantity, a body necessarily re-
quires a body equal to it.”12 This claim embodies Hudson’s insight that a 
substance’s being entirely located requires there being no region of space-
time disjoint from the place occupied by the substance, but translated into 
9I talk of “spiritual” substances rather than (say) immaterial ones so as not to beg any 
questions, since Hudson, as we shall see, believes that entension entails materiality. Scotus 
would disagree; I return to the issue in my conclusion below.
10Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 219 (Vatican ed., 7:254), quoting Aristotle, 
Physica IV, c. 4 (212a20–21). For discussion of Scotus’s views of place, see my Physics of Duns 
Scotus, 193–213. See too Lewis, “Space and Time,” 70–78.
11Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 220 (Vatican ed., 7:255). For the ‘two-dimen-
sional’ terminology, see, e.g., Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, 187.
12Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2. p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 233 (Vatican ed., 7:160).
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Scotus’s two-dimensional account of the place of a body. But extended 
bodies have an internal ordering, such that no proper part exactly coin-
cides with any other proper part: “It is not intelligible that there is some 
extended quantum if we cannot designate in the whole an order of this 
part to that, according to some intervening quantity.”13 And, in line with 
this, Scotus’s Aristotelian definition of quantity identifies extension as the 
ordering of part outside part: “Part outside part is required for the posi-
tion which is a difference of quantity, as ‘outside’ relates per se to the parts 
of the body.”14
We need to be careful with terminology, and I pause a moment to 
make these matters clearer. Extension, for Scotus, is exclusively an intrinsic 
property—the internal ordering of parts. Scotus would take atomless 
gunk—things that are parts all the way down—to be ipso facto extended. 
Scotus’s place is a relation between an object and an extended region. Place 
is thus a relational property; to the extent that we think of extension as 
a relation between bodies and regions, we would make the extension of 
extension, so to speak, wider than Scotus would, including both Scotus’s 
(monadic) extension and Scotus’s (relative) place. As we shall see, what 
is at issue for Scotus, in his discussion of the relation between spiritual 
substances and place, is a case or set of cases in which these two proper-
ties—monadic extension and relational extension—fall apart: a case or set 
of cases in which something lacking monadic extension might nevertheless 
exist in a place, or have relational extension, so to speak. In what follows, 
I use (unmodified) “extension” in Scotus’s monadic sense; if I want to talk 
about relational extension, I talk about the extension of the region or place 
which an object occupies.
On Scotus’s understanding, then, extended bodies cannot entend:
For this reason [viz. that the body and the place have the same two-dimen-
sional quantity], the body is commensuratively in a place, such that a part 
of the contained surface coincides with a part of the containing surface, and 
the whole to the whole.15
Here, an extended whole has proper parts that fail to be located where the 
whole is. Extended bodies, then, pertend (mutatis mutandis):
“x pertends” =df x is an object that is entirely located at a non-point-sized 
region, r, and for each proper subregion of r, r*, x has a proper part entirely 
located at r*.
Having spelled out these various relations (being in an actual place, 
being in an equal place, and being commensuratively in a place) in the case 
of extended (i.e., pertending) substances, Scotus very helpfully goes on 
to consider angelic location (i.e., the location of an entending substance) 
13Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 10, p. 1, q. 1, n. 61 (Vatican ed., 12:72).
14Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 10, p. 1, q. 1, n. 73 (Vatican ed., 12:76); see Aristotle’s discussion 
of quantity at Categoriae, c. 6 (4b20–23, 5a15–24).
15Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2. p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 233 (Vatican ed., 7:260). 
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under the same headings.16 I discuss this in my next section, along with 
what Scotus has to say about divine location. For now, I want to pause 
to tighten up my assumption that Scotus’s two-dimensionalist view of 
place can be readily translated into Hudson’s three-dimensionalist view 
of space. It might be thought that I am not entitled to hold this: after all, 
while Hudson’s three-dimensional pertension clearly entails Scotus’s two-
dimensional commensuration, the opposite entailment does not hold. So 
an unsympathetic critic might hesitate to follow me. I will therefore at-
tempt to argue the case briefly here. (I need this only to the extent that 
Hudson’s “entension” is spelled out in a three-dimensional way. It may 
be that what Scotus says on the question of spiritual substance entails for 
these purposes accepting some kind of three-dimensional space, running 
through spiritual substances, not just surrounding them; I am not sure. 
But I want to cover all the bases, so to speak.) So what I need is a way 
of showing that Scotus accepts in some sense that bodies occupy three-
dimensional regions, not just the two-dimensional surfaces of regions.
On the negative side, Scotus follows Aristotle in sharply distinguishing 
place-occupancy from part-whole relations:
An extended body is actually in a place, because it is in something that actu-
ally exactly contains it: for it could not be in a place other than if it makes the 
edge (which is the immediate container) actual because it makes the sides 
of the containing body to be distant [from each other]. But it is different in 
the case of a part in a whole, which does not make a potentially containing 
surface actually a surface; and for this reason a part is not in a whole in the 
way that what is located is in a place (Physics IV).17
On one reading, this might seem to make it a matter of principle that it 
is not possible that those proper parts of bodies that do not include the 
surface of the body occupy places, and hence cannot occupy regions of 
space. (Scotus says “potentially containing” because anything that is a 
real internal part of a body would occupy a place, were all other parts 
of the body cut away. And he claims that contained bodies are causally 
responsible for making room for themselves, as it were—causing the con-
taining body to wrap itself around the contained body, and thus making 
the “edge” of that body “actual”—think of air or water surrounding a 
solid body.)
But on the positive side, it seems to be a matter of metaphysical ne-
cessity that it is not possible that those proper parts of a body that do 
not include the surface of the body are themselves contiguous to any 
container, and thus not possible that they occupy places in Scotus’s Aris-
totelian sense, other than to the extent that they are proper parts of a body 
16Scotus adds “being determinately in this place, or in another” (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 
2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 216 (Vatican, 7:253)., which, as it turns out, is intended simply to rule out 
being “everywhere” (see Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 246 [Vatican ed., 7:265]).
17Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 232 (Vatican ed., 7:260); see Aristotle, Physica 
IV, c. 5 (212b3–6). 
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that is so contiguous and thus occupies a place. So we should not put too 
much stress on this counter-evidence to the view that Scotist bodies oc-
cupy regions, not just places. Furthermore, we should take Scotus’s view 
of place-occupancy to maintain (unsurprisingly) that a body standardly 
occupies a given volume without interpenetrating any other body. But 
Scotus holds that total bodily interpenetration is at least logically possible: 
God can bring it about that two extended bodies occupy the same place—
there are obvious theological examples. And in that case, Scotus claims, 
the two bodies would coincide with each other part by part, right the way 
through (and not just at the surfaces). As Scotus puts it, the one body is 
“with another body,”18 and he contrasts this view of spatial coincidence 
with one according to which the one body is squeezed into the empty 
spaces in another body—a view I label “Squeeze”:
These [viz., theologians holding Squeeze], if they want to say that [a body] 
cannot be in the same place (simul) as another unless it should enter into the 
gaps (subintrando poros) [of the other body], should even more have to say in 
consequence that it could not be with another body other than because the 
other gives way to it, as air gives way to an arrow.19
The point of the passage is that theologians holding Squeeze would have 
to say as well that the only way in general for two bodies to be united is 
for them to be contiguous, such that one “gives way” to the other. Nothing 
much surprising about the conclusion, I suppose. But in any case, Scotus 
wants to reject Squeeze, and hold that two bodies can be in the same place 
by fully interpenetrating each other. We might think of space-occupancy in 
something like the same way: for a body to occupy a region of space is for 
that region of space to interpenetrate the body.20 The formal features (not 
the physical ones) of both sorts of interpenetration are the same, coinciding 
part by part right the way through—contrast Squeeze, which clearly, and 
by design, does not satisfy this requirement. In short, if Scotus’s theory can 
accommodate the structural features of bodily interpenetration, it should 
be able to accommodate the structural features of region-occupancy. And 
that is all I need.
2. Scotus on the Place of Spiritual Substances
God
The key later medieval text on divine presence—used by both Aquinas 
and Scotus—can be found in Peter Lombard’s Sentences:
It should be kept in mind that God, who exists immutably in himself, is in 
every nature or essence by presence, by power, and by essence, without his 
18Scotus, Reportatio IV, d. 49, q. 15 (printed as Ordinatio IV, d. 49, q. 16, n. 4 [Wadding ed., 
10:612]).
19Scotus, Reportatio IV, d. 49, q. 15 (printed as Ordinatio IV, d. 49, q. 16, n. 4 [Wadding ed., 
10:612]).
20For this way of talking, see Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, 77.
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being limited (sine sui definitione), and in every place without circumscrip-
tion, and in every time without mutability. And furthermore he is in holy 
spirits and souls in a more excellent way, namely, indwelling by grace. And 
he is in the man Christ in the most excellent way, “in whom the fullness di-
vinity dwelled in a bodily way” (as the Apostle says [Colossians 2.9]). For in 
him God dwelled not by the grace of adoption, but by the grace of union.21
This gives us three modes of general divine presence: by presence, power, 
and essence. There was not a great deal of controversy about the first two 
of these. As Scotus understands it, for God to be in all things “by pres-
ence” is for all things to be “open and transparent to his knowledge”; and 
for God to be in things by power is for God to be the “efficient and con-
serving” cause of them.22 The third case is more complex. Scotus claims 
that God is present “by essence” by interpenetrating everything:
If [God] is considered under the notion of his infinity and limitlessness, as 
he intimately interpenetrates (intime illabitur) each thing, in this way he is in 
all things through essence.23
What weight should we give to this kind of language? Does it specifically 
signal entension, as opposed to (e.g.) causal presence? On the one hand, 
talk of interpenetration (illapsus) is commonplace, certainly occurring in 
Aquinas’s discussion of God’s indwelling in the human mind.24 But, on 
the other, Aquinas does not employ it in his general account of divine or 
angelic presence: it is restricted to God’s causal influence simply on cogni-
tive agents. Scotus uses it in strongly spatial ways, without this restriction. 
For example, when discussing the circumincession or mutual indwelling 
of the three persons of the Trinity, he notes that this indwelling is rather 
like the non-causal component of God’s illapsus in creatures: the result, as 
Scotus notes, of his immensity.25 It is “even more perfectly like” the inter-
penetration of two bodies—suggesting again a rather spatial account of 
divine presence (even of God’s presence to himself).26
Scotus’s treatment of some of the formal properties of divine location 
make it clear that he has something very similar to Hudson’s proposal in 
mind. In particular, he argues that non-extended substances are such that 
they are wholly located at any subregion of the region occupied by the 
substance. Scotus makes the point in response to an objection: “A whole 
is something outside of which there is nothing. . . . But God is whole in 
some place; therefore he is not outside that place.”27 The idea in the objec-
tion is that if God entirely occupies a region of space, God cannot occupy 
21Lombard, Sententiae I, d. 37, c. 1, n. 2 (1:263–264).
22Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 35 (2:445).
23Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 35 (2:446–447).
24Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles II, c. 98, n. 18.
25Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 19, q. 2, n. 64 (Vatican ed., 5:297). 
26Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 19, q. 2, n. 65 (Vatican ed., 5:297). 
27Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 3 (2:438). 
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any further region of which that region is a subregion. Scotus’s reply in 
effect claims that an entending substance can be wholly located at a place 
without that entailing that the place is not itself a subregion of a larger 
place that the substance entirely occupies. Scotus makes his point by ex-
amining just what it might be that “outside” is supposed to be excluding, 
in ways that mirror very closely Hudson’s definitions of being “entirely 
located” and being “wholly located”:
When it is said that a whole is something outside of which there is nothing, 
I say that if “outside” is referred to the whole, then the proposition is true, 
under this sense: “A whole is that outside of which there is nothing of the 
whole.” But if “outside” is referred to some place in which the whole exists, 
then the proposition is false, under this sense: “A whole is somewhere in 
some place outside of which place there is nothing,” because the whole itself 
[viz. God] is outside of this place essentially and really. In the same way, it 
could be said of [my] soul which is a whole in my finger. For none of it in the 
finger is outside of itself; but the whole is certainly outside the finger, such 
that “outside” can here be related to the whole or to the finger. And in the 
first way it is true, and in the second way false.28
The reply is that the objection’s central claim (“a whole is something 
outside of which there is nothing”) is true, in the case of God’s place-
occupancy, if it is understood to mean that nothing of the whole is outside 
the whole (compare “there is no region of spacetime disjoint from r at 
which x is located,” to quote Hudson’s definition of “x is entirely located 
at r”). But it is false if understood to mean that there could be nothing of 
a whole outside some place that the whole occupies (compare “for each 
proper subregion of r, r*, x is wholly located at r*,” to quote from Hudson’s 
definition of “x entends”). A being such as God is fully in any given place 
without that entailing that he is not fully in some other place too. Scotus’s 
example is a created spiritual substance, a soul, which, as the form of an 
animate body, is fully in each of the body’s limbs. But it is also outside each 
limb, and yet not outside itself.29 The aim is to show that God’s entending a 
region, r, does not involve God’s entirely occupying any subregion, r*, of r; 
and that God’s wholly occupying r* is compatible in principle with God’s 
wholly and entirely occupying r.
Angels
Parallel to his treatment of the divine case, Scotus’s discussion of the ways 
in which angels can entirely occupy particular non-point-sized regions 
suggests that they too entend the regions they occupy.30 We can see this if 
we consider the three relations that characterize the location of physical 
bodies and their application (or not) to the angelic case. An angel cannot 
be in an actual place in Scotus’s Aristotelian sense, since “it does not make 
28Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 31 (2:445).
29Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 31 (2:445).
30For Scotus on angelic presence, see Suarez-Nani, “Angels, Space and Place,” 99–111.
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the sides of the container distant [from each other].”31 Neither can it be 
commensuratively in a place, “since it does not have parts corresponding 
to the parts of a place.”32 An angel thus has no proper parts that fail to be 
located exactly where the whole angel is located. But an angel is “equal” 
to its place, in the sense that it is entirely located at a particular region.33
Scotus devotes considerable space to discussing what kinds of con-
straints there might be on the sizes of place that an angel can occupy. His 
basic idea is that since an angel, as a non-extended substance, has no in-
ternal spatial structure—no extension in Scotus’s sense—it can occupy a 
place of any shape:
Whatever can be in one equal place, can also be in another, if there is no 
configuration, by which one is distinguished from another, repugnant to 
it. But in an angel there is no configuration of a place, in which it exists, re-
pugnant to it. Therefore, if it can be in one equal place, it can be in another. 
Consequently, if it can be in a small rectangle, and [if] no rectangle, how-
soever narrow, is repugnant to it (which we have to say, given that it is not 
repugnant to it to be in any shape of place), it seems that it is not repugnant 
to it to be in any place howsoever long, because that rectangle is equal to the 
small rectangle in which [the angel] can exist.34
There is “no configuration” of place incompatible with the existence of 
an angel at that place. So there are no restrictions on the kinds of shape 
that an angel can occupy. The examples are (I think) differently shaped 
hexahedra: provided that the overall volume remains the same, the angel 
is indifferent to occupying this or that hexahedral structure.35
Scotus believes too that angels can occupy places of different volumes, 
within certain finite limits. The assumption is that there is a natural size 
for the region an angel occupies, and that increasing or decreasing the 
volume of this region both require power. An angel’s expanding itself 
into an infinite region would require infinite power—the more an angel 
stretches itself out, so to speak, the more power it expends. So an angel, 
with merely finite power, could never occupy the whole of an infinitely 
extended universe (God, as we shall see, is a contrasting case here). Scotus 
reasons too that an angel’s making itself indefinitely smaller, so to speak, 
would also require infinite power. So there is a limit beyond which an 
angel cannot expand or contract, and the limit is determined by the extent 
of the angel’s power over itself.36
31Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 237 (Vatican ed., 7:261).
32Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 245 (Vatican ed., 7:265).
33See Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 238 (Vatican ed., 7:261–262).
34Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 239 (Vatican ed., 7:262).
35Despite talking about rectangles in the passage, Scotus’s official line is that an angel 
could not in fact occupy a two-dimensional place, since (as Scotus believes) such a place 
would have to be infinite in at least one dimension: see Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, 
nn. 239–240 (Vatican ed., 7:262–263).
36Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 241 (Vatican ed., 7:263). I do not know what 
Scotus would or should say about the “extension” of angels in the case that there is no phys-
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Note that the entire discussion is wholly geometrical and physical, in-
volving no reference to any other angelic attribute. Augustine and John of 
Damascus are relevant authorities; but so too are Aristotle and Euclid.37
This leaves as an open question whether or not an angel could occupy 
a point (since beginning to occupy a point—a zero-extension position—is 
hardly a case of contraction, and thus does not fall prey to the finite-power 
argument); and Scotus is agnostic.38 He summarizes:
It seems that it should be conceded that [an angel] has a determined place, 
but indeterminately. In this way there is both some place than which it can-
not have a larger, and some than which it cannot have a smaller (speaking of 
a place that is a continuum), though it can perhaps be in a point.39
“It can perhaps be in a point”: what more does Scotus say about this most 
scholastic of questions? What is notable about the Scotist positions I have 
examined thus far is that they fundamentally deal with angelic location 
as a matter of geometry, to be decided along geometrical lines. When 
discussing the possibility that an angel might occupy a point, the only 
objection that Scotus considers at any length has to do with a geometrical 
question that arises from Aristotle’s Physics: could a point, a zero-exten-
sion space-occupier, move (supposing, as Scotus and his opponent did, all 
angelic motion to be possibly continuous)? The negative claim was made 
by William of Ware, an Oxford Franciscan of the 1290s, and supposedly 
Scotus’s teacher in the Franciscan convent there:
An angel . . . [cannot be] in an indivisible place, because then it could not 
move itself, since it would mark out infinitely many points in the space 
across which it moved itself.40
Aristotle himself rejected the possibility of the motion of an indivisible 
on the grounds that anything that moves must first traverse an extension 
equal to or less than itself before traversing an extension greater than it-
self.41 Scotus offers an entirely physical response to Aristotle, and uses this 
response to defend the possibility of the motion of an angel occupying a 
non-extended region: Aristotle’s claim, Scotus avers, is true only in the 
case of the motion of an extended body; it is simply false, and question-
ical universe. He sometimes speaks about “privative” dimension: the extension that a body 
would occupy were the body to have a place (see my discussion in Physics of Duns Scotus, 
207–208). So perhaps he could give a counterfactual account: an angel occupies a (privative) 
extension equivalent in dimension to the actual dimension of the place that an angel would 
occupy were there a real place for the angel to occupy.
37At Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 238 (Vatican ed., 7:262) Scotus appeals to Euclid, 
Elementa I, prop. 35 (1:85).
38Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, nn. 242–243 (Vatican ed., 7:264).
39Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 243 (Vatican, 7:264); the whole discussion is nn. 
243–244 (Vatican ed., 7:264–265).
40William of Ware, In sententias II, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1 (quoted in Apparatus F in the edition of 
Scotus, Lectura II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2 [Vatican ed., 18:167]).
41Aristotle, Physica VI, c. 10 (241a6–14), discussed by Scotus at Ordinatio II, d. 2. p. 2, q. 5, 
n. 303 (Vatican ed., 7:285–286).
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begging, in the case of the motion of a non-extended one. So an angel 
occupying a point could still move.42
In sum, then, both angels and God de facto occupy finite regions co-
extensive with physical bodies: in God’s case, the entire finite physical 
universe (on which, see the next section).43 Presumably, Scotus would hold 
that, in Scotus’s spherical geocentric universe, God occupies every place in 
that spherical region—rather as Scotus’s angels generally seem to occupy 
hexahedral regions, albeit (as it seems) rather smaller in volume than God. 
Were the universe infinite in extent, of course, God would wholly occupy 
every region in a shapeless infinite volume. And an angel could not do 
this, since (unlike God) it does not have the infinite power required to 
stretch itself out indefinitely—as we have seen.
3. Scotus’s Criticism of Aquinas’s Position
This leaves it an open question whether or not spiritual substances occupy 
places derivatively (i.e., in virtue of some other property) or fundamentally 
(i.e., non-derivatively). Scotus, as I shall show in this section, maintains 
that they occupy places fundamentally. He defends this view in the con-
text of a rejection of Aquinas’s derivative account. But, as Scotus notices, 
Aquinas, while consistent in claiming that spiritual substances occupy 
places derivatively, can be read as offering different accounts of this de-
rivative place-occupation in the case of God, on the one hand, and created 
spiritual substances, on the other. In brief, Aquinas appears to maintain 
that, in the divine case, place-occupancy is not reducible to any other 
property, albeit that it is grounded on some other property. But in other 
cases, Aquinas seems to adopt a straightforwardly reductionist account. 
In either case, the relevant non-derivative property is activity—activity at a 
place. In what follows, I do not attempt a systematic account of Aquinas’s 
views, but lay them out only in sufficient detail, and in such a way, as to 
allow us to make sense of Scotus’s response to them.44
Aquinas on God’s Presence
Just like Scotus, Aquinas makes Peter Lombard’s analysis of the modes 
of divine presence the focal point of his discussion.45 But in the clearest 
42Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, q. 5, nn. 424–425 (Vatican ed., 7:342–344).
43Note a curious though correct consequence of Scotus’s Aristotelian notion of place: since 
the universe lacks a container it is not in a place in Scotus’s sense. On the lack of a place for 
the universe, see my Physics of Duns Scotus, 205. God, of course, as a ubiquitous entending 
substance, is wholly located at every place in the universe.
44For a complete account of Aquinas’s views, including careful analysis of the differences 
between the various accounts Aquinas offers, see Fuerst, Historical Study of the Doctrine of the 
Omnipresence of God, 169–200. See also Goris, “Divine Omnipresence in Thomas Aquinas,” 
37–58. I find myself in substantial agreement with the thrust of both of these accounts, 
though neither appeals to what seems to me to be the crucial passage in favor of Aquinas’s 
anti-reductionism, quoted at n. 47 below.
45See Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2 c; Summa theologiae I, 
q. 8, a. 3 c.
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account of God’s presence, found in the early Sentence commentary, Lom-
bard’s analysis does no substantive work. Aquinas argues here that the 
three modes of divine presence highlighted by Peter Lombard amount 
to the same thing. To be in things by presence is for the divine essence to 
be “applied” to a thing by operation; the divine essence is in things by 
power because operation and power are not distinct; and because power 
and essence are identical, if God is in things by power he is in things by 
essence.46 But in this early work, Aquinas maintains that God’s presence is 
grounded on operation, but that this presence is a relation that is in some 
sense distinct from the operation:
When it is said that God is everywhere, what is implied is a certain relation 
of God to a creature, through which God is said to be in things, based (fun-
data) on operation (operationem).47
The idea, roughly, is that operation and relation represent distinct Aris-
totelian categories, and thus the one—the relation—cannot be reduced 
to the other—the activity. And the relation between them is asymmetric: 
presence is based or grounded on activity. So on Aquinas’s view, presence 
is derivative on activity, but not reducible to it: presence non-reductively 
supervenes on activity. Given divine simplicity, I suppose we should say 
that the categories are distinct here in the sense that the relations in the 
creatures are distinct: being caused and being in the presence of are distinct 
relations.
Why suppose that operation or activity requires presence? Aquinas per-
sistently accepts an Aristotelian principle about the impossibility of action 
at a distance: “It is necessary for every agent to be conjoined to that on 
which it immediately acts.”48 It is in this sense that he later (in the Summa 
theologiae) comes to understand presence by essence: unlike presence by 
power—which can be exhibited by causes that act merely through sec-
ondary or instrumental causes—presence by essence requires the immediate 
presence of cause to effect.49
We might wonder how this Aristotelian contact condition might be 
characterized in the case of a spiritual substance. The condition is, after all, 
supposed to explain how causal interactions between the spiritual and the 
material are possible. Aquinas does not have much to say. At one point, he 
claims that the relevant kind of contact is “metaphorical contact,” which 
he simply describes as contact “through action.”50 And elsewhere he ex-
plains the relevant kind of contact as amounting to a substance’s “virtually 
46Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 2 c.
47Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum I. d, 37, q. 2, a. 3 c.
48Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 1 c, referring to Aristotle, Physica VII, c. 2 (243a3–6). 
For a discussion of Aquinas’s rejection of the possibility of action at a distance, see Decaen, 
“The Impossibility of Action at a Distance.”
49See Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 8, a. 3 c.
50Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum I, d. 37, q. 3, a. 1 c.
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contain[ing] the thing with which it comes into contact.”51 But “virtually 
containing” something is here most likely to mean having that thing as the 
object of a power (virtus). In short, virtual contact is contact by action or 
activity. But be this as it may, the significant claim is that whether or not the 
contact condition turns out to be vacuous, Aquinas persistently infers pres-
ence from activity on the grounds that action at a distance is impossible.
Aquinas on Angelic Presence
Aquinas’s view on the nature of angelic presence is (as far as I can make 
out) somewhat different from this. Angelic presence is derivative on an-
gelic activity, but not distinct from it:
An angel cannot be definitively located or determined to some place other 
than by its action and operation—and this is the third opinion, which posits 
that an angel is in a place in so far as its operation is applied to some place. 
. . . And for this reason, following this opinion (which seems more reason-
able), I say that an angel, and any incorporeal substance, is in a body or a 
place only through an operation that causes some effect in it [viz. the body 
or place].52
What makes it true that the angel is at a place is simply its operation at 
that place, “through” which (viz. the operation) it is “in . . . a place.” Con-
trast the divine case: in this latter case, what makes it true that God is at 
a place is something additional—the relation between God and the place, 
“through which [viz. the relation] God is said to be in” a place. The truth-
makers of the relevant location-locutions consist, respectively, in the angel 
+ the operation, and God + the place-relation.
I would not, incidentally, go to the stake for this interpretation. It is 
quite possible to read Aquinas as trying to claim that angels have the rela-
tion being in a place in virtue of their operation at that place, and thus that 
his account of angelic presence is aligned with his account of divine pres-
ence. It is hard to tell from the few rather scattered remarks that he makes. 
Scotus, as we shall see, is quick to spot the ambiguity and to attempt to 
capitalize on it.
So on my preferred reading of Aquinas’s view, an angel’s presence at a 
place is reduced to its immediate activity at that place. Likewise, the ques-
tion about the shape and size of angels is reduced to one about the shape 
and size of the physical bodies over which they can exercise causal power:
It is not necessary that there is determined to [an angel] a place that is in-
divisible in layout (secundum situm); but rather divisible or indivisible, or 
larger or smaller, to the extent that he voluntarily applies his power to a 
larger or smaller body.53
51Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 52, a. 1 c. 
52Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum I, d. 37, q. 3, a. 1 c; see Summa theologiae I, 
q. 52, a. 1 c.
53Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 52, a. 2 c. I say “he” to capture no more than the thought 
that angelic agency is in a crucial sense personal.
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Restrictions on an angel’s external power (over material objects), not on its 
internal power (to fit itself into differently-sized regions), determine the 
shape and size of the place that it occupies. Aquinas deals similarly with 
another question, that of the simultaneous existence of more than one 
angel in one place. For Aquinas, this would require more than one angel 
simultaneously counting as the total secondary cause of just one effect—a 
possibility that is ruled out on the grounds of causal overdetermination: 
“it is impossible that there are two complete causes immediately of the 
same thing.”54 (Aquinas here assumes that angelic presence requires being 
the total cause of some material effect. I am not sure why.)
Scotus against Aquinas
Scotus rejects all of these claims. Against Aquinas’s view of divine pres-
ence, Scotus argues that divine presence cannot be derivative on causal 
presence. Scotus delights in detecting systematic inconsistencies in the 
views of his opponents, and his basic strategy here is to criticize the lack of 
theoretical generality in Aquinas’s account of divine and angelic presence:
In the question “Whether God is everywhere” he [viz. Aquinas] proves the 
positive in this way, that according to Aristotle in Physics VII “the mover is 
contiguous with the moved,” and God is the first efficient cause and for this 
reason able to move every movable object, and from this concludes that God 
is in all and present to all. I ask what he intends to prove from this. Either 
[he intends to prove] that God is present, that is, moving [things], and then 
the question is begged (est petitio principii), because the premise is the same 
as the conclusion, and the answer is irrelevant to the question, because there 
he aims to conclude the immensity of God as God is present to everything. 
Or he intends to prove that presence which pertains to God in so far as he 
is immense, and then, according to him [viz. Aquinas], that presence which 
pertains to divine immensity (which belongs to God as God) is inferred 
(sequitur) from his operation somewhere, such that God will be present as 
immense earlier (by nature) than [he is present] as operating. And this is 
concluded from the fact that he is present through operation, just as the 
prior is proved from the posterior. Therefore, likewise in the case at hand, 
the angel will be present to some place through [its] essence naturally prior 
(by nature) to its being present to it through its operation.55
The context here is a discussion of angelic presence, and Scotus assumes 
that Aquinas accepts a reductionist account of such presence. The passage 
then tries two strategies to reject such an account. Both take it that Aquinas’s 
account of the presence of spiritual substances should have some kind of 
theoretical unity. The first grants that Aquinas accepts a reductionist ac-
count not only of angelic presence but also of divine presence. Scotus then 
reports an argument from Aquinas that goes something like this: God is the 
54Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 52, a. 3 c.
55Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 204 (Vatican ed., 7:246–248). Scotus here refers 
to Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles III, c. 68, n. 2. The argument here is about motion (changing 
things); but the overall discussion is about causal relations more generally.
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cause of everything; any cause is essentially present to (is in contact with) 
its effects; so God is essentially present to everything. The worry is this: 
what does “being essentially present to a thing” mean? If it means being 
the immediate cause of that thing, then the argument begs the question; and, 
likewise, the conclusion is not the one that Aquinas seems to be aiming for, 
because it seems that he wants to show something more than this causal 
presence (“the answer is irrelevant to the question”).
This strategy is probably not successful against every reductionist ac-
count of divine presence. It would be possible to suppose, for example, 
that being essentially present to a thing and being the immediate cause of that 
thing are coextensive without its being the case that “being essentially 
present to a thing” and “being the immediate cause of that thing” mean the 
same thing. And in this case, we might think, the rejected inference would 
go through, pace Scotus’s objection. In modern terms, Scotus mistakenly 
identifies reductionist and eliminativist accounts of divine presence. On 
his reading of reductionist accounts of divine presence, they entail elimi-
nating the relevant category from ontology. But that is not right: indeed, 
the point of reductionist accounts is in some sense to preserve the rel-
evant category. So the confusion of reductionist accounts and eliminativist 
accounts means that the argument does not count against modern reduc-
tionist accounts of divine presence.
I do not think that this matters much as a criticism of Aquinas since (as 
Scotus at least suspects) the reductionist account of divine presence is not 
one that Aquinas accepts in any case. So the second strategy assumes that 
Aquinas accepts a non-reductionist account of divine presence. Aquinas’s 
reasoning, as presented by Scotus, is that activity requires essential pres-
ence and contact. This is a general claim that Aquinas uses to support the 
view that God is essentially present to the universe. But if the claim is 
general, then it should apply in the angelic case too. If activity requires 
essential presence and contact, then angelic activity requires essential pres-
ence and contact too, against Aquinas’s claim that angelic presence reduces 
to angelic activity. Scotus in this passage talks about essential presence 
being “naturally prior” to causal presence, which is technical Scotus-speak 
for asserting that essential presence is necessary for causal presence.
This, of course, is all ad hominem. Scotus’s substantive criticism of the 
derivative account challenges not only modern reductionist accounts but 
also the motivation for Hudson’s non-derivative account, and it seems to 
me is worthy of careful consideration independent of its historical context. 
Scotus argues from a case in which—it seems—the contact condition is 
not only inapplicable but incompatible with a bit of Christian doctrine. 
Scotus considers the case of creation ex nihilo. God’s creating a place must 
be causally and ontologically antecedent to his occupying that place. So 
essential presence must depend on causal presence, not vice versa:
God, when he creates something de novo, is made to be present to that thing 
through essence, having been non-present to that thing through essence. 
And this is done not by any change in God; so [it is done] therefore through 
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a change on the part of the creature. Therefore it is necessary to presuppose 
the change of the creature from non-existence to existence, through divine 
activity, logically prior to God’s being present to it through essence. So God 
produces something through his power prior to being present to it through 
essence.56
The idea is that God is changeless, and thus any relations between God and 
creatures are real merely in the creature—they are in effect just extrinsic 
denominations of God.57 And they must be consequent on the existence of 
the creatures, and thus consequent on the divine activity that brings such 
creatures about. And essential presence is one such relation. So creation 
cannot require the contact condition—indeed, it seems to be incompatible 
with it, to the extent that the contact condition makes causal presence de-
pend on essential presence. Scotus uses this kind of consideration against 
the applicability, in this context, of Aristotle’s contact principle tout court. 
The priority of causal presence in one case of divine action shows that 
contact—essential presence—is not presupposed to divine action.58 So this 
argument puts pressure on Hudson’s view, at least to the extent that this 
view attempts to demystify causal relations between God and creatures. 
But it undermines Aquinas’s view: if activity cannot guarantee presence 
by essence, it cannot constitute an analysis of the necessary supervenience 
base for presence.
Scotus’s remaining arguments also attempt to find ways of rejecting the 
Aristotelian contact condition. In sharp contrast to Hudson, who thinks 
that ubiquitous entension might provide a way of demystifying questions 
about God’s causal interaction with the material world (and who would 
thus doubtless be sympathetic to Aristotle’s contact condition), Scotus 
holds that the contact requirement holds only for interactions between nat-
ural objects, and thus that it is irrelevant to the question of divine activity:
When it is said that it is necessary for an agent to be joined to its effect on the 
grounds that mover and moved must be together (simul), this is irrelevant to 
what is proposed by the person holding this view [viz. that we can infer om-
nipresence from omnipotence], because the Philosopher speaks of a natural 
agent and a natural patient.59
The Philosopher, of course, is Aristotle. According to Scotus, the contact 
argument is relevant (if at all) only in the case of agents that cause in virtue 
of their “active qualities,” which have to do something, at a place, in order 
to bring about an effect. God is not like this.60 Indeed, for a disembodied 
56Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 21 (1:443).
57On this, see Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 30, qq. 1–2, nn. 49–51 (Vatican ed., 6:192). Scotus does 
not mean that there are no true relational predications of God; merely that what makes these 
predications true are the non-relational substances and/or accidents along with the relational 
accidents that are, and are in, creatures.
58See Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 20 (2:442–443).
59Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 16 (1:440).
60Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 16 (2:440–441).
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agent such as God to cause something is simply for him to will it; and 
nothing about willing an effect entails existing where the effect does.61
In effect, Scotus argues that action at a distance is possible, and on the 
basis of this that ubiquity with respect to essence is conceivably a contin-
gent feature of God’s, even given the existence of space. Scotus discusses 
the rejection of the contact condition in two different contexts, angelic 
and divine. He argues that angels do not have to be present where they 
act. They can communicate with each other over a distance, for example, 
without causing anything in the medium between them.62 Given that more 
powerful agents can act over a greater distance than less powerful ones, 
maximal power might lead one to conclude not that the contact criterion 
is applicable, but to the contrary—that greater distance from an effect is 
possible in the case of a maximally powerful agent.63 The difference be-
tween the angelic and divine cases is simply that the finite power of angels 
restricts the distance over which they can act.64
Likewise, Scotus imagines a scenario in which God acts at a distance in 
his causal activity:
Supposing that God were not present to an effect through his essence, but 
that he was in one determined place—for example, in heaven, sitting on a 
throne, as old women imagine—he could through his will still cause the ef-
fect that he now causes, without further presence.65
Here causal presence is strongly contrasted with essential presence: God 
can occupy some of the space in which he is causally present without oc-
cupying all of it. Admittedly, as Scotus makes clear in a parallel discussion, 
this argument is understood by him to have an impossible antecedent.66 
But he does not believe that the impossibility is the result of any evident 
contradiction. (It is the result of a contradiction, in fact, but not one that 
is evident to unaided human reason: I return to this in the next section.) 
Here, causal presence is prior to, and a necessary condition for, essential 
presence. But it is not a sufficient condition, and essential presence turns 
out to be independent of causal presence.67
This might seem rather implausible, but Scotus attempts to motivate it 
by isolating counterinstances to the contact principle even in the physical 
61Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 19 (2:442).
62Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 9. qq. 1–2, n. 56 (Vatican ed., 7:160).
63Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 17 (2:441). 
64Scotus, Lectura II, d. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (Vatican ed., 19:34–35).
65Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 19 (1:442).
66Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 37, q. un., n. 7 (Vatican ed., 6:301). 
67At one point Scotus seems to say something conflicting: “For God, being in a creature 
and conserving that creature in being are the same”: Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 
33 (2:446). I take it that all that Scotus means to highlight is the fact that neither of these are 
real relations in God, since no relations to creatures inhere in the divine essence (on this, see 
n. 57 above). Of course, the grounds for the two relational predications (“God is in a crea-
ture”; “God conserves a creature”) are different, since one is causal, and the other not.
406 Faith and Philosophy
world: the action of the sun in generation, for example;68 or the problem of 
how causal activity in generation can extend beneath the surfaces that are 
in contact.69 Clearly, here, Scotus’s antiquated physics has misled him. But 
he, of course, was not to know that.
I suppose that Aristotle’s contact criterion is what any reductionist 
about omnipresence—anyone who believes that it is reducible to omnipo-
tence—needs to abandon. So reductionists should not be troubled by the 
thought of action at a distance: after all, they accept action from nowhere. 
And it is possible to feel some sympathy for Scotus’s overall worry about 
contact in this dialectical context. If the notion of causal interaction be-
tween spiritual and material substances is mysterious, this mystery does 
not seem much mitigated by positing virtual contact, which seems as ob-
scure as the notion that it is invoked to explain. To preserve Aristotle’s 
authority, Scotus glosses the contact requirement counterfactually: a dis-
tant agent is present “as if it were present through its essence”; it is “not 
that its power is present, but that it can cause an effect by its power just as 
if it were there, even though neither it nor its power is there.”70 This is, of 
course, mysterious; but no more so than Aquinas’s virtual contact.
What Scotus says about divine presence is theoretically consistent with 
what he says about angelic presence. And he believes himself to have a 
very good authoritative reason to suppose that non-causal presence, in the 
angelic case, cannot be reduced to causal presence. Among the proposi-
tions condemned in 1277 by Stephen Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, is this:
That separated substances are somewhere by operation, and that they can-
not move from one extreme to another, or into the medium, other than be-
cause they can will to operate either in the extreme or in the medium—this is 
an error, if it be understood that a substance is not in a place, or moves from 
place to place, without operation.71
Key here is the rejection of the view that a causally inactive angel would 
be nowhere: a position that Scotus takes Aquinas’s reductionist position 
to entail: “it would follow [on Aquinas’s view] that an angel is sometimes 
(indeed, frequently), nowhere”—namely, when the angel has no causal 
effect in the material world.72 And, as Scotus notes, “Against this [viz. the 
opinion of Aquinas] is that it was condemned as one of the articles con-
demned and excommunicated by the Bishop of Paris.”73
Scotus likewise rejects Aquinas’s views on the impossibility of more than 
one angel in a place. He is agnostic on the substantive question, but rejects 
68Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 58 (Vatican ed., 7:161).
69Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 59 (Vatican, 7 ed.,161–162). For these cases, see the 
discussion in Kovach, “Action at a Distance.”
70Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (Vatican ed., 7:163).
71Article 204 (in Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 1:554). On this, see my “The Con-
demnations of 1277.”
72Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 207 (Vatican ed., 7:249).
73Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 200 (Vatican ed., 7:244).
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Aquinas’s argument, as we might expect, on the grounds that “it presup-
poses something false, namely that an angel is in a place only by operation.”74
4. Omnipresence, Divine Perfection, and Human Reason
As I have just suggested, Scotus holds that it is in fact a necessary truth that 
God’s presence to the universe consist in (in effect) ubiquitous entension. 
But as we have seen, Scotus believes that there is no implication accessible 
to natural reason between perfection and essential omnipresence. Essen-
tial omnipresence is a perfection, but why it is so remains mysterious. To 
see this, consider the thought that power to act at a distance would be 
an opposing and incompatible perfection: there is, according to Scotus, 
no way to choose between them as great-making properties independent 
of revelation. Oddly enough, Scotus believes that omnipotence is simi-
larly a perfection, but that it too cannot be shown to be such by natural 
reason. He believes that God can be shown to be the universal cause. But 
he believes that omnipotence requires more than this: it requires being 
able to cause everything directly. And Scotus is not sure that direct causa-
tion is not an imperfection, involving God more, rather than less, in the 
physical universe.75 (Recall Aristotle’s thought that the first mover would 
be demeaned were it to have any cognitive or causal connection with the 
cosmos.) So omnipresence is doubly inaccessible to natural reason.
So why does Scotus accept God’s essential omnipresence? Principally, it 
seems, on the basis of Patristic authority.76 That said, at one point he offers 
what he calls a “persuasive” argument in favor of his view, an argument 
that he formulates on the basis of some hints in Peter Lombard:
God is either everywhere, nowhere, or somewhere but not elsewhere. Not 
in the third way, because then he would be limited like other things that 
are determined, circumscriptively or definitively to a certain given place. 
Neither can it be said that he is nowhere, because this seems to be proper to 
what is nothing (proprium nihilo). . . . Therefore it is necessary to say that God 
is everywhere through his essence.77
“Persuasive” arguments are, very roughly, those that appeal to plausible 
intuitions rather than to necessary a priori truths. Scotus borrows the three 
options (everywhere, nowhere, somewhere but not everywhere) from 
Lombard. But Lombard does not spell out the conclusion that Scotus later 
draws, simply noting that (as he thinks) no one would “dare to say” that 
God was nowhere, or somewhere but not everywhere.78 The danger of 
Scotus’s argument here is that it could prove too much—God has to be 
somewhere, and for God to be somewhere he has to create a physical 
74Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 1–2, n. 280 (Vatican ed., 7:276–277).
75On this, see my Duns Scotus on God, 94–96.
76See Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 28 (2:444).
77Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, nn. 25–27 (2:444).
78Lombard, Sententiae I, d. 37, c. 4, n. 3 (1:269).
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universe. Presumably the property of being nowhere is a property of every-
thing real in the case that there is no physical universe. Being nowhere is 
the mark of nothing (so to speak) only in the case that there is a physical 
universe. (This too seems a bit too strong: we might think that both God 
and angels could be nowhere in the sense of not occupying any physical 
place, even given that there are physical places that they could in principle 
occupy. But this, of course, requires accepting that divine presence could 
be not merely non-derivative but also contingent—something that Scotus 
does not countenance other than for the sake of a thought experiment.)
Setting this Scotist conclusion aside, it seems to me that there may be 
a very significant theoretical advantage to accepting an account of God’s 
presence by essence that is both non-derivative and makes it a contingent 
divine property. In the context of a discussion of Hudson’s view, James 
Gordon has recently argued that entension allows for a robustly realist 
account of divine absence—think for example of the very vivid account of 
God’s departure from the Temple recounted in Ezekiel 10.79 Since part of 
Hudson’s express aim is to allow for an account presence that demystifies 
the notion of God’s causal interactions with a physical universe, I am not 
sure how welcome he would find Gordon’s view. But it seems to fit rather 
neatly with what Scotus has to say. (Of course, Scotus supposes such ab-
sence scenarios to be counterpossible. But we need not.) I assume that, on 
a view such as this, God’s infinite power means that he could occupy as 
small a place as he wished, and—like an angel—could occupy a point, or 
even exist in no place at all. Again, I do not think natural reason would 
enable us to adjudicate as to the status of (possible) spatial absence as a 
great-making property.
The question of the accessibility to natural reason of God’s ubiquitous 
presence by power is rather more complex. If we understand “presence 
by power” to signify simply God’s being the creator and conserver of the 
actual universe, then the presence by power is accessible to natural reason 
(according to Scotus), since God’s being the creator and conserver of the 
universe is so accessible.80 And this is Scotus’s official account of presence 
by power, as we saw at the beginning of section 2 above. But if we were to 
understand “presence by power” in the way that the later Aquinas does—
i.e., as immediate causal presence—we would have to say that this cannot 
be shown by natural reason, just as omnipotence cannot be. Scotus does 
not consider this interpretation of “presence by power.” But he does con-
sider a third one. We could understand the notion modally, such that God is 
present by power to the whole set of objects that are or can be the end term 
of his power. And in this sense, we can know by natural reason that God 
is omnipresent in this way: “If God is considered according to the notion 
of an efficient or conserving cause, he is said to be in things by power, 
79See Gordon, “Rethinking Divine Spatiality.” I am grateful to Prof. Gordon for sharing 
his work with me.
80See my Duns Scotus on God, 29–39. 
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because possible beings are the end term of his power.”81 Scotus goes on 
to argue that presence “by power” in this sense must be distinct from 
presence “by essence.” After all, God can be present by essence only to 
things that actually exist. But God is present by power in this modal sense 
throughout the infinity of non-existent space, and if we did not distinguish 
this kind of presence from essential presence, we would have to hold that 
God is essentially present throughout the infinity of non-existent space:
Before the creation of the universe, it was no more the case that God was 
here, where the universe now is, than it is that he is outside the imagined 
universe, where nothing is. Therefore it was not the case that he, existing 
there and present through his essence, created the universe. But given that 
he was not present anywhere through his essence, he could act there, and be 
present through his power. And in this way he can even now, through his 
power, create an angel outside the imagined universe, where there is noth-
ing, and where he is not present through his essence. Therefore he is present 
though power and operation prior to presence through essence.82
Here again Scotus attempts to show that the priority of causal presence 
over essential presence is required by the doctrine of creation: in this case, 
the doctrine requires the priority of modal presence by power over pres-
ence by essence.
Talk of God’s being “outside of the imagined universe, where there 
is nothing” seems at first glance odd: we might reasonably think of the 
“imagined universe” as nothing, contrasting with the real universe, and 
Scotus himself sometimes talks of imaginary space in this way.83 Edward 
Grant has highlighted a passage from a slightly earlier thinker, Pseudo-
Siger of Brabant, that perhaps casts some light on this:
To Pseudo-Siger of Brabant, the term “beyond” (extra) could signify either 
a true place or one that is imaginary (secundum imaginationem). For we can 
perceive something by our imagination only if it is in a place. Presumably, 
then, if we wish to imagine a body beyond the world, we must first imagine 
a place for it, even though no such place exists there.84
The idea is that God is present by power throughout the actual universe, 
and in all possible space, whether or not we imagine that space to include 
a body. Whatever possible (finite) body we can imagine, God exists “by 
power” beyond that body. A reductionist view of divine presence by es-
sence, then, had better not understand presence by essence to be reducible 
to this modal kind of presence by power, on pain of making God far too 
present: absurdly, making God present where there is nothing to be present 
81Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 35 (2:446).
82Scotus, Reportatio I, d. 37, qq. 1–2, n. 20 (2:442).
83See, e.g., Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 37, q. un., n. 9 (Vatican ed., 6:302): “We should not 
imagine an infinite vacuum before the creation of the world, as though God were present 
there by essence before he produced the world”; see too, e.g., Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 3, 
n. 174 (Vatican ed., 7:88).
84Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 119, referring to Pseudo-Siger of Brabant, 
Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, 179.
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to. Scotus’s God is (or can be) essentially present only where there is some-
thing other than himself.85
5. Concluding Comments
Hudson takes it to be an implication of his position that God is corpo-
real and material. According to Hudson, this will follow if we accept his 
entension view (according to which “God . . . inherits the shape, size, 
dimensionality, topology, and boundaries of whatever is the most inclu-
sive region”),86 and an analysis of “material object” in terms of “simple 
occupancy.”87 This is, I take it, part of Hudson’s demystifying strategy. 
Scotus would agree with the inheritance claim, provided that this relation 
is not understood to introduce any internal ordering of parts, any intrinsic 
extension. But he would not quite agree with Hudson’s conclusion, for the 
rather technical reason that he would not accept the simple occupancy 
analysis of “material object.” Scotus believes that a necessary condition 
for being material is the possession of (prime) matter—the potentiality for 
substantial change.88 Neither God, nor angels, nor human souls, have such 
potentiality.89 And Scotus believes that a necessary condition for being 
bodily is being the kind of thing that is or can be extended (in his sense). 
For example, he considers the hypothetical case of a non-extended (viz. 
point-like) quality (whiteness). An objector maintains that there could be 
no such thing on the grounds that
whiteness without quantity would be a spiritual quality, because indivisible, 
and it would be a bodily quality, because in the third species of quality, and 
thus would be spiritual and non-spiritual.90
The “third species of quality” comprises those qualities that Aristotle 
labels “affective” qualities91—those that are “productive of an affection of 
the senses”:92 things that we would label “secondary qualities.” The idea 
is that such qualities are real, physical, features of physical objects. The 
conclusion, of course, is supposed to be contradictory.
85Aquinas, of course, does not think of presence by power in this modal way: it is simply 
God’s causing actual spatial things. So Aquinas is not, as far as I can see, vulnerable to 
an objection along these lines (to the effect that Aquinas’s God will need to be present by 
power through infinite non-existent space). The argument in favor of essential presence that 
Aquinas offers begins from God’s actual causal activity (not his possible causal activity), and 
argues on the basis of this that God needs to be present by essence since causal activity 
requires and presupposes contact.
86Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 210–211.
87Hudson, “Omnipresence,” 210. 
88On prime matter and materiality, see, e.g., Scotus, Lectura, I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 38 
(Vatican ed., 16:339); 
89For God’s lack of prime matter, see Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 7–8 (Vatican 
ed., 4:154–155).
90Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 12, p. 1, q. 2, n. 118 (Vatican ed., 12:333).
91See Aristotle, Categoriae, c. 8 (9a29–9b32).
92Aristotle, Categoriae, c. 8 (9b7–8).
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Scotus’s reply seems to concede the possibility of non-extended corpo-
real items (at least in cases that the same item with extension would be 
homoeomerous—a white patch, in this case); the burden of his response is 
to deny the contradiction:
[Whiteness without quantity] would be simply speaking a bodily or corpo-
real quality, because simply speaking it is determined to perfect a body. But 
it is qualifiedly incorporeal, since it is not actually a corporeal being—just 
as a corporeal substance, even though it were without quantity, would be 
corporal, since it is naturally apt to exist under quantity (whereas an angel 
is not thus apt); and it would also be actually indivisible, but divisible in 
remote potency or aptitude.93
The point is that being corporeal simpliciter—being potentially divisible—
and being qualifiedly incorporeal—being actually indivisible—are not 
contradictories: any quality can begin to be extended (begin to inhere in 
something extended), and thus become divisible. But such a quality—and, 
indeed, a corporeal substance, according to this passage—need not be ex-
tended.
So Scotus would only allow that God, angels, and souls were bodies in 
the case that they could be extended. But he would deny that God could 
be extended, for the simple reason that extension is an accident and God 
is not receptive of accidents.94 What about angels or souls? In the passage 
just quoted, Scotus says that an angel “is not apt” to exist under quantity. 
And he says a number of other suggestive things too. First of all, there 
could not be a colored angel:
Just as a stone cannot be wise, because it has no receptive capacity with 
respect to wisdom, so an angel cannot be white, since it is in no way recep-
tive of this form (whether the form is posited to be divisible or indivisible). 
Indeed there are two reasons why an angel cannot be white: one is the exten-
sion in the form and the lack of extension in the angel; and the other reason 
is because this form is this form, and an angel is an angel. And the second 
reason, not the first, is the essential reason for the impossibility.95
So angels, just in virtue of the kinds of thing they are, could not be 
subjects of corporeal qualities. One might well imagine that, a fortiori, 
they could not be subjects of corporeal quantities such as extension. (The 
passage, though, asserts only that they are not the subjects of such quanti-
ties, not that they could not be.)
Secondly, Scotus sometimes repeats the scholastic commonplace that 
quantity supervenes on matter, and quality on substantial form: “Quantity 
follows the composite in virtue of matter, and quality in virtue of form, 
because form is simply more perfect than matter, Metaphysics VII, c. 2.”96 
93Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 12, p. 1, q. 2, n. 124 (Vatican ed., 12:335).
94See, e.g., Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 1, n. 15 (Vatican ed., 4:159).
95Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 12, p. 1, q. 2, n. 125 (Vatican ed., 12:335–336).
96Scotus, Ordinatio IV, d. 12, p. 1, q. 2, n. 131 (Vatican, 12:337), referring to Aristotle, Meta-
physica VII, c. 3 (1029a5–6).
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Quality, presumably, is more perfect than quantity, and this is what grounds 
the inference.
And, thirdly, Scotus elsewhere suggests a reason why this might be so. 
The key feature of immaterial substances is their capacity for intellectual 
cognition, and Scotus suggests, using grounds that originate in the Liber de 
causis, that nothing material could have such a capacity:
We could not prove [that only something unextended could have immate-
rial cognition] other than from the condition of the object related to the act—
unless perhaps from reflection, since we experience that we reflect on the act 
of cognition, and nothing with quantity is able to reflect on itself.97
The idea is that no extended item is fully accessible to itself: part is ac-
cessible to part, but there is always an inaccessible part, as it were: the 
part doing the accessing. Only a non-extended item is fully transparent to 
itself. Of course, the argument relies on there not being cognitively inert 
immaterial substances.
So Scotus’s spiritual substances are spatial, but not material or corpo-
real in Scotus’s technical medieval senses. In this way, then, Scotus would 
defend a spatial God while avoiding Hudson’s materializing conclusion.98
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